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Abstract
In the consistent histories formulation of quantum theory, the probabilistic predic-
tions and retrodictions made from observed data depend on the choice of a consistent set.
We show that this freedom allows the formalism to retrodict contrary propositions which
correspond to orthogonal commuting projections and which each have probability one. We
also show that the formalism makes contrary probability one predictions when applied to
Gell-Mann and Hartle’s generalised time-neutral quantum mechanics.
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1. Introduction
The consistent histories approach to quantum theory, pioneered by Griffiths[1,2],
Omne`s[3,4], and Gell-Mann and Hartle[5,6,7], is perhaps the best attempt to date at a
precise formulation of quantum theory that involves no “hidden” auxiliary variables and
can be applied to closed systems. Since modern ideas in cosmology and quantum gravity
require an interpretation of the quantum theory of the universe, the approach has natu-
rally attracted a good deal of interest. It seems, however, that without new axioms, whose
precise form is presently unknown, it is impossible to derive the standard predictions of
classical mechanics and Copenhagen mechanics from the consistent histories formalism,
since predictions essentially always depend not only on known data and the hamiltonian
but on the selection of a particular consistent set[8]. This is true even if predictions
are made conditional on the persistence of quasiclassical physics[9]. It should be said,
nonetheless, that debate over the scientific status of the formalism continues and that its
proponents tend to regard its lack of predictive power with more equanimity than do its
critics.
This letter, though, looks at the logical properties of the consistent histories formalism
rather than interpretational questions. It is helpful immediately to introduce a little logical
terminology. We say that two projection operators P and Q are complementary if they fail
to commute: PQ 6= QP . We say that they are contradictory if they sum to the identity,
so that P = 1−Q and PQ = QP = 0. Finally, we say that they are contrary if they are
orthogonal and not contradictory, so that P < 1−Q and again PQ = QP = 0.
The somewhat counterintuitive properties of consistent sets of histories have, of course,
already been extensively investigated in the original literature[1,3,5] and elsewhere[8,10].
We describe here a feature which seems to have gone unnoticed, namely that different
consistent sets extending a given history can imply, with probability one, propositions
which are contrary.
It is well known that the predictions and retrodictions made in different sets generally
correspond to complementary projections and so are incompatible. This, in itself, might
be taken as merely an extension to the consistent histories context of the familiar fact that
non-commuting observables cannot simultaneously be assigned values. The inferences we
consider here, though, correspond to commuting but orthogonal projections. The fact that
they are nonetheless each assigned probability one in their respective sets is a result with no
parallel in standard quantum theory. It raises the question of whether the present version
of the consistent histories formalism is a natural generalisation of Copenhagen quantum
mechanics.
2. The Consistent Histories Formalism
We begin with a brief description of the simplest version of the consistent histories
formulation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, in which sets of histories correspond to
sets of projective decompositions. While consistent histories can be defined abstractly on
any Hilbert space H, it is generally assumed that operators corresponding to the hamil-
tonian H and other physically interesting observables, such as position, momentum and
spin, are given. The dynamics, however, are irrelevant to the examples we consider, so
that we will take H = 0 and will not need to distinguish any particular operators as simple
physical observables.
We are interested in a closed system whose initial density matrix ρ is given. We will
also be interested in applying the formalism to a version of the time-neutral generalisation
of quantum mechanics first discussed by Aharonov, Bergmann and Lebowitz[11]. This
can be thought of as a non-relativistic version of the theory which would be obtained
by imposing initial and final conditions in quantum cosmology, and requires an initial
density matrix, which we take to have the standard normalisation and write as ρi, and
final boundary conditions defined by a positive semi-definite matrix ρf normalised so that
Tr(ρiρf ) = 1. The initial and final matrices ρi and ρf then give boundary conditions for
the system at times ti and tf , with ti < tf .
It may be helpful to think of the system under discussion as a non-self-interacting
quantum system that is prepared in the state ρi at t = ti and then isolated until t = tf ,
when it is observed in the state ρf . The Hilbert spaceH here should then be thought of as a
subspace of the full Hilbert space, which includes the degrees of freedom of the preparation
and measuring apparatuses, and the full Hamiltonian is nonzero. In the examples we
consider, both ρi and ρf are pure and H is three-dimensional or higher. Such examples
can, of course, easily be realised in the laboratory.
The physical propositions we are interested in correspond to members of sets σ of
orthogonal hermitian projections P i, with
∑
i
P i = 1 and P iP j = δijP
i. (2.1)
These projective decompositions of the identity should be thought of as being applied at
definite times. The times are usually appended to the sets of projections, so that σj(tj) =
{P ij (tj); i = 1, 2, . . . , nj} defines a set of projections obeying (2.1) and applied at time tj .
However, as our results depend only on the time ordering, we will omit explicit time labels
and take sets of the form S = {σ1, . . . , σn} to be ordered with time increasing from left to
right. The projections correspond to propositions about the system in the usual way. For
example, a projection onto the σz = 1/2 eigenspace of a spin-1/2 particle applied at time t
corresponds to the statement that the particle was in the σz = 1/2 eigenstate at the relevant
time. The consistent histories formulation differs from Copenhagen quantum mechanics,
however, in that there is no dynamical projection postulate attached to statements of this
type.
Suppose now we have a list of sets σj of this form. Then the histories given by
choosing one projection from each σj in all possible ways are an exhaustive and exclusive
set of alternatives. We use Gell-Mann and Hartle’s decoherence condition, and say that S
is a consistent set of histories if
Tr(P inn . . . P
i1
1 ρP
j1
1 . . . P
jn
n ) = δi1j1 . . . δinjnp(i1 . . . in) , (2.2)
or, in the time-neutral case,
Tr(ρfP
in
n . . . P
i1
1 ρiP
j1
1 . . . P
jn
n ) = δi1j1 . . . δinjnp(i1 . . . in) . (2.3)
When S is consistent, p(i1 . . . in) is the probability of the history {P
i1
1 , . . . , P
in
n }. We say
the set
S′ = {σ1, . . . , σk, τ, σk+1, . . . , σn} (2.4)
is a consistent extension of a consistent set of histories S = {σ1, . . . , σn} by the set of
projections τ = {Qi : i = 1, . . . , m} if τ is a projective decomposition and S′ is consistent.
Suppose now that we have a collection of data defined by the history
H = {P i11 , . . . , P
in
n } (2.5)
which has non-zero probability and belongs to the consistent set S. This history might,
for example, describe the results of a series of experiments or the observations made by an
observer. To make scientific use of the formalism we then want to make further inferences
from the data. In the standard formalism, this can only be done relative to a choice
of consistent extension S′ of S.2 Once S′ is fixed we can make probabilistic inferences
2 We consider only the standard formalism here. It is possible to amend the formalism
by appending axioms which identify natural retrodictions[3,12,13]. If only these retrodictions
are allowed, contrary retrodictions are avoided. However, this would also exclude almost all
scientifically desirable retrodictions[13].
conditioned on the historyH. For example, if S′ has the above form, the histories extending
H in S′ are Hi = {P i11 , . . . , P
ik
k , Q
i, P
ik+1
k+1 , . . . , P
in
n } and the history H
i has conditional
probability p(Hi)/p(H).
We use the convention that the calculation is made at the time of the last event from
the history, so that any projection occurring before this last event is a retrodiction. Thus
if k = n then p(Hi)/p(H) is the probability with which the proposition corresponding to
the projection Qi is predicted; if k < n it is the probability with which the proposition
is retrodicted. The different S′ are to be thought of as different, equally valid, possible
pictures of the past and future physics of the system, or more formally as different and
generally incompatible logical structures allowing different classes of inferences from the
given data.
3. Contrary retrodictions and predictions
We now give two simple examples of contrary inference in the consistent histories
formalism. The Hilbert space H is taken to be of dimension greater than or equal to three.
Example 1 Take ρ = |a〉〈a|, where the normalised vector |a〉 defines the initial state
of the system. Define the projection Pc = |c〉〈c|, for some normalised vector c such that
0 < |〈 a | c 〉| ≤ 1/3. Suppose that the data correspond to the history H = {Pc} from
the consistent set S = {{Pc, 1 − Pc}}. Now consider a consistent extension of the form
S′ = {{Pb, 1− Pb}, {Pc, 1− Pc}}, where Pb = |b〉〈b|/|〈 b | b 〉| for some unnormalised vector
|b〉 with the property that
〈 c | b 〉 〈 b | a 〉 = 〈 c | a 〉 〈 b | b 〉 . (3.1)
It is not hard to verify that S′ is consistent and that the conditional probability of Pb given
H is 1. It is also easy to see that there are at least two mutually orthogonal vectors |b〉
satisfying (3.1). For example, let |v1〉, |v2〉, |v3〉 be orthonormal vectors and take |a〉 = |v1〉
and |c〉 = λ|v1〉+µ|v2〉, where λ
2+µ2 = 1 and we may take λ and µ real. Then the vectors
|b±〉 = λ|v1〉+
µ
x
|v2〉 ±
(x− 1)1/2µ
x
|v3〉 (3.2)
both satisfy (3.1) and are orthogonal if x is real and x2λ2 = (x − 2)(1 − λ2), which has
solutions for λ ≤ 1/3. Thus this construction produces consistent sets which give contrary
probability one retrodictions.
Example 2 Now consider the formalism applied to generalised quantum mechanics,
choose vectors |a〉, |b〉 and |c〉 as above, take ρi = |a〉〈a| and ρf = Pc/C, where the
normalisation constant C = |〈 a | c 〉|2. Suppose that the data correspond to the history
H = {Pa} from the consistent set S = {{Pa, 1− Pa}}, and consider consistent extensions
of the form S′ = {{Pa, 1− Pa}, {Pb, 1− Pb}} where Pb is as in Example 1. As above, the
conditional probability of Pb given H is 1, so that we obtain consistent sets which give
mutually contrary probability one predictions.
Note that it is impossible to produce an example in which the formalism makes contrary
predictions when applied to ordinary quantum mechanics. In this context, if P is predicted
with probability 1 from the history H = {P1, . . . , Pn} in the set S, then
PPn . . . P1ρ
1/2 = Pn . . . P1ρ
1/2 , (3.3)
and
QPn . . . P1ρ
1/2 = 0 (3.4)
if Q ≤ (1 − P ). Thus if a projection Q orthogonal to P belongs to any consistent set
then its probability in that set, conditional on the history H, is zero. It is also easy to
see that we can construct examples in which any number of consistent sets make mutually
contrary retrodictions — or, in the case of time-neutral quantum mechanics, predictions
— by taking the dimension of H to be sufficiently large and choosing |〈 a | c 〉| sufficiently
small.
Though the contrary inferences in the above example both correspond to one-
dimensional projections, it is easy to construct similar examples of contrary inferences
corresponding to projections of different dimension since, given the above initial and fi-
nal states, the condition for a projection P to correspond to a probability one consistent
inference is simply that 〈a|P |c〉 = 〈 a | c 〉. Thus contrary inferences could not be avoided
by introducing a unitary equivalence relation — perhaps along the lines of those recently
considered by Gell-Mann and Hartle[14] — according to which any pairs of projections
involved in contrary inferences are declared physically equivalent.
4. Conclusions
The incompatibility of the logics corresponding to different consistent sets is generally
described as a natural generalisation of the principle of complementarity in Copenhagen
quantum mechanics: a discussion making precisely this point can be found, for example, in
Chapter 5.4 of Omne`s’ recent book[4]. There is, though, no parallel in standard quantum
mechanics for the prediction and retrodiction of contrary propositions, and many might feel
that no acceptable interpretation of quantum theory should allow such inferences. Indeed,
Omne`s comments that “The worst event would be if two different ways of reasoning could
lead to different conclusions when one is using two different consistent logics. In view of
this danger, which would mean that the present approach is completely wrong, we shall
initially discuss how two different logics can be related to each other.”[15]
Now Omne`s has in mind here a slightly different possibility, namely that if two propo-
sitions both belong to two distinct consistent sets, and one implies the other in one set,
the implication might fail in the other set. This cannot happen in the consistent histories
formalism. It is not possible, for example, to use the same set of data to predict the
proposition P in one set and its negation (1 − P ) in another, both with probability one.
At first sight it may seem as though the above examples do precisely this. The reason why
they fail to do so is that, in the consistent histories formalism, if we have two propositions
corresponding to projection operators P ≤ Q (i.e. the range of P is a subspace of that of
Q) and if P is predicted with probability one, it does not follow that Q is predicted with
probability one (or with any other probability).
It might possibly be argued that this last feature is less of a flaw, and that the ex-
amples above are less worrying, than the type of contradictory inference Omne`s considers
— but it is hard to see why. The fact that the theory stipulates that the pictures corre-
sponding to different sets are incompatible alternatives cannot be used as a defence here
without allowing the same defence in the case of Omne`s’ hypothetical disaster. Clearly, no
logical contradiction arises if we suppose that different consistent sets simply give different
pictures of the physics and if we make no stipulation whatsoever about the relationship
between these pictures. But the same of course is true of the analogous supposition about
inconsistent sets of histories. To justify the fundamental assumption of the consistent
histories formalism — that it is precisely the consistent sets which give sensible physical
descriptions — we need to suppose the following. First, that it is wrong — a product
of misguided classical intuition — to suppose that contrary propositions P and Q should
never be inferred with probability one in different sets. Second, that it is right — a fun-
damental feature of quantum physics — to suppose that contradictory propositions P and
(1 − P ) should never be inferred in different sets. This is certainly not the standard un-
derstanding of the situation, and there seems no obvious reason to adopt it. One might
plausibly try to argue that both suppositions are right, or conceivably (depending on how
the descriptions are to be used) that both are wrong, but it seems particularly hard to
argue for one and against the other.
Another possible counter-argument is that, in the end, scientists need only worry
about predictions, and contrary predictions can be avoided by restricting the formalism
to standard, rather than generalised, quantum mechanics. One difficulty with this line of
defence is that it is the retrodictive cosmological applications of the consistent histories
formalism that are presently the most interesting. Unlike other approaches to quantum
theory, the formalism allows us to discuss series of past cosmological events and to assign
probabilities to them, even when some or all of the events occurred before the formation
of classical structures. Prediction, on the other hand, is where the consistent histories
formalism is at its weakest. No coherent interpretation of the formalism has been found
which unambiguously implies the standard predictions of Copenhagen quantum mechan-
ics, although those predictions (among many others) can be reproduced by calculations
within the formalism. Moreover, though the formalism allows many different predictive
calculations, those which are new seem to be physically irrelevant except in highly implau-
sible scenarios and, possibly, in the case of generalised time-neutral quantum cosmology.
This, though, is precisely the case in which contrary predictions arise.
If we reject these defences we seem to be left with the conclusion that the contrary
inferences implied by the consistent histories formalism make it hard to take it seriously
as a fundamental theory in its present form. This means that further constraints beyond
consistency are needed in order to construct a natural generalisation of the Copenhagen
interpretation to closed systems. Whether physically sensible and mathematically precise
constraints can be found in standard versions of the formalism, such as the one above,
is an important and intriguing open question. It might also be interesting to investigate
the analogous problem in the more abstract schemes characterising the logical structure
of consistent histories which have recently been developed.[16]
Note added
After writing this Letter, my attention was drawn to Cohen’s interesting analysis[17]
of an example due to Aharonov and Vaidman[18]. Ref. [17] includes what seems to be the
first consistent histories analysis of an example in which contrary inferences arise.3 Ref.
[17] is a critique of Aharonov and Vaidman’s arguments rather than those of the consistent
histories literature, so that the implications for the consistent histories formalism are not
considered in any detail.
A response to the present Letter, defending the consistent histories formalism, can
be found in Ref. [19]. Griffiths stresses the point, emphasized above, that the consistent
histories formalism can be interpreted in a way which leads to no logical contradiction.
As mentioned above, it seems that further natural constraints beyond consistency
seem to be needed for a sensible formulation of the quantum theory of closed systems.
It turns out that at least one such constraint exists: a stronger version of the consistent
histories formalism, designed to avoid the problems discussed in this paper, is described
in Ref. [20].
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